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PRACTITIONERS' NOTES
WELLNESS PROGRAMS, THE ADA, AND GINA:
FRAMING THE CONFLICT
E. PierceBlue*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA")' is a vast
encompasses a number of policy goals and initiatives. Perhaps
that
law
the most important goal, however, is a reduction in the overall cost of
healthcare-also known as "bending the cost curve."2
The expansion of incentives that companies can offer as part of
employee wellness programs-initiatives that encourage healthy
behaviors, monitor health and, sometimes, provide rewards for the
achievement of certain health outcomes-is one of the many cost

* E. Pierce Blue currently serves as a Special Assistant and Attorney Advisor to
Commissioner Chai R. Feldblum of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The
views expressed in this article do not represent the views of Commissioner Feldblum or the
Commission. As of the writing of this article, the Commission has held a hearing on wellness
programs and the ADA and GINA but has not issued a policy pronouncement on the application the
ADA and GINA to wellness programs. The author understands that persons might be tempted to
scrutinize this article for hints about what the Commission may do in this area. However, the author
stresses that this piece contains no such hints.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. See e.g., THOMAS DASCHLE & DAVID NATHER, GETTING IT DONE: How OBAMA AND
CONGRESS FINALLY BROKE THE STALEMATE TO MAKE WAY FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 157

(2010) ("If Congress didn't find a way to keep healthcare costs from rising out of control, the public
would never consider health care reform to be a success."); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (Nov.
2013) ("The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed against a backdrop of decades of rapid growth
in health care spending in the United States . . . A key goal of the ACA was to begin wringing these
inefficiencies out of the health care system, simultaneously reducing the growth of health care
spending - and its burden on families, employers, and state and federal budgets - while increasing
at
available
delivered."),
care
the
of
quality
the
2
.pdf
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/healthcostreportfinalnoembargov
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containment measures included in the law. Though comprehensive data
on the impact of the programs is limited, companies and benefit experts
believe they have great potential. The CEO of Safeway even claimed
that widespread adoption could reduce the nation's overall health costs
by forty percent.'
But there is a problem with the statutory scheme that Congress put
in place to regulate these programs. As commentators and the
Department of Labor itself noted when it first issued rules on the use of
incentives in wellness programs in 2006, a number of laws, including the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")6 and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"), 7 could pose problems for companies
seeking to implement incentive programs.8 And though it was expected
that Congress would remedy that problem in the ACA, the law is silent
on how the two laws should interact. 9

3. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(j) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74 (excluding P.L. 11366 & 113-73)).
4. See generally Employer Health Benefits 2010 Annual Survey, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR., at 2, 200 (forty-four percent of total respondents stated that
their wellness programs reduced health costs); Leonard L. Berry et al., What s the Hard Return on
Employee Wellness Programs?HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2010, at 105, 106 (citing positive outcomes
reported by private-sector employers who use wellness programs on health care savings,
absenteeism, and employee satisfaction).
5. See Steven A. Burd, Op-Ed., How Safeway Is Cutting Health-CareCosts: Market-based
solutions can reduce the national health-care bill by 40%, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124476804026308603.
6. See §300gg-4(j) (Westlaw).
7. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000ff-l(b)(2) (West 2012).
8. The preamble to the 2006 HIPAA regulations included the following paragraph:
Many other laws may regulate plans and issuers in their provision of benefits to
participants and beneficiaries. These laws include the ADA, Title VII, the Family and
Medical Leave Act, ERISA's fiduciary provisions, and State law. The Departments have
not attempted to summarize the requirements of those laws in the HIPAA
nondiscrimination rules. Instead, these rules clarify the application of the HIPAA
nondiscrimination rules to group health plans, which may permit certain practices that
other laws prohibit. Nonetheless, to avoid misleading plans and issuers as to the
permissibility of any plan provision under other laws, the Departments included, in both
paragraph (h) and paragraph (b) of the regulations, references to the potential
applicability of other laws. Employers, plans, issuers, and other service providers should
consider the applicability of these laws to their coverage and contact legal counsel or
other government agencies such as the EEOC and State insurance departments if they
have questions under those laws.
71 Fed. Reg. 75014, 75015 (Dec. 13, 2006); see also infra Part II.b.
9. The ACA amendments state that wellness programs will not "violate this section" if they
comply with the standards set forth in the amendment, leaving open the possibility that plans which
comply with that section might still violate other laws. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that
Congress considered and rejected the following language which would have explicitly exempted
wellness plans from the ADA, GINA, and other statutes:
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Perhaps part of the reason why Congress failed to clarify the
intersection of the ADA, GINA and ACA on this issue is that the
problem has not been clearly defined. One frequently hears that
uncertainty exists but it is rare to see a full explanation of the nature of
the problem.
This is, of course, a very important question. The nature of a
problem tells one quite a bit about how solutions need to be framed. The
goal of this article is to set forth the ways in which one could define this
tension by working through the relevant statues, regulations, legislative
histories, and case law. It does not put forward a firm conclusion on
which frame is best or most appropriate. The law is simply too much in
flux for that to be worthwhile. Rather, the hope is that defining the
various frames will provide a valuable service to the policy debate
around this issue.
II. WHAT ARE WELLNESS PLANS?

The term wellness program encompasses a wide array of employer
and insurer initiatives aimed at improving the health of employees and
policy users.10 The plans range from the mundane-offering discounted
gym memberships or sponsoring daily walks"-to the complexproviding premium reductions for weight loss or the achievement of
other health goals.12
The use of wellness plans is growing rapidly in the United States. 13
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") National
Nothing in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, or the Genetic Information
Non-discrimination Act of 2008 shall be construed to prohibit a covered entity from
adopting, sponsoring, administering, or providing products or services in connection
with, or relating to, programs of health promotion or disease prevention that requests
individuals to participate in medical examinations, answer medical inquiries, or complete
health risk assessments or questionnaires, if such requirements are otherwise authorized
under this Act.
See EEOC, Written Testimony ofJennifer Mathis, Directorof Programs,Bazelon Centerfor Mental
Health Law, On Behalf of the Consortiumfor Citizens with Disabilities (May 8, 2013), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/5-8-13/mathis.cfm.
10. EEOC, Written Testimony of Karen Pollitz, Senior Fellow Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation(May 8, 2013), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/5-8-13/pollitz.cfn.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See ELI R. STOLTZFUS, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, COMPENSATION &
WORKING CONDITIONS: ACCESS TO WELLNESS AND EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (April 22, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/access-to-

wellness-and-employee-assistance-programs-in-the-united-states.pdf
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Compensation Survey, approximately fifty-four percent of full-time
employees in the public and private sectors had access to a wellness
program in 1998-1999.14 By 2008, the BLS reported that the number
had increased to eighty-two percent. 15 And, in 2013, a survey by the
Kaiser Family Foundation found that ninety-nine percent of large firms
and seventy-six percent of small firms offered some kind of wellness
benefit. 16
There is no study or report that defines what the "average" wellness
plan looks like. However, the use of comprehensive surveys of
employee health called Health Risk Assessments ("HRAs") appears to
be a common feature in many.17 The contents of the HRAs vary but
they tend to include questions covering the employee's medical statussuch as presence or absence of heart disease, smoking history, etc.-and
current biometric readings-such as blood pressure, cholesterol, body
mass index, etc.' 8 Information gathered from the HRA is then used by
plan administrators to alert participants to health risks and guide users to
specific wellness programs (which may or may not have incentives
attached).' 9
In order to incentivize the completion of the HRAs and
participation in wellness programs, employers will often offer a penalty
or reward.2 0 The size of these rewards/penalties varies widely.2 1 The
Kaiser Family Foundation Survey found that fifty-five percent of large
firms that used HRAs offered some financial incentive. 2 Examples of
financial incentives used by employers completing the survey ranged
from smaller premium/deductibles for participants to gift cards or
merchandise.23
There have also been a handful of anecdotal reports about specific
incentive programs used by large corporations. In March of 2013, for
instance, it was reported that CVS planned to impose a fifty dollar per
month penalty on all employees who failed to participate in its wellness
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey, 2013 HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. &
HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR., at 2, 206, available at http://ehbs.kff.org.
17. A Kaiser Family Foundation Survey found that twenty-three percent of small firms with
wellness plans utilized an HRA and fifty-five percent of large firms with wellness plans used an
HRA. See id. at 203.
18. See id. at 203-04.
19. See id. at 203.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 209.
22. Seeid.at210.
23. See id. at 202.
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plan-a plan that required the completion of an HRA.24 And, in 2009,
during the debate over the ACA, the CEO of Safeway, Inc. wrote a
widely disseminated op-ed detailing the company's program which
offered a sixty-five dollar per month reward to individuals who met four
health benchmarks-tobacco use, healthy weight, acceptable cholesterol,
and acceptable blood pressure.25
III. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
26
There are four laws involved in this legal puzzle. The ACA, the
27
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), the
ADA, 28 and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
("GINA"). 29 For our purposes, these laws can be grouped into two
The first-ACA and HIPAA-dictate the scope of
categories.
group health plans and group health insurance issuers can
that
incentives
offer while still complying with HIPAA's requirement that plans and
30
The secondissuers not discriminate on the basis of health factors.
ADA and GINA-govern when and how employers can seek medical
information from their employees. 31 The following sections detail how
the laws in each of these categories, and the regulations and guidance
that accompany them, if applicable, impact wellness programs. The
section concludes with a discussion on the applicability of the ADA's
health care safe harbor to wellness programs.

A. HIPAA and the ACA
HIPAA and the ACA impact wellness programs through the

24.

See Walter Hamilton, Report: CVS Caremarkdemands workers disclose weight, health

info, L.A. TIMEs, March 20, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/20/business/la2

fi-mo-cvs-caremark-workers-weight- 0130320.
25. See Burd, supra note 5.
26. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
27. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scatted sections of 42
U.S.C.).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1635 (2013).
30. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAQs ABOUT AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IMPLEMENTATION
PART V AND MENTAL HEALTH PARITY IMPLEMENTATION (Dec. 22, 2010), available at

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdflfaq-aca5.pdf.
31. See Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: GINA, the ADA, and Genetic
Discriminationin Employment, 36:4 J.L. MED & ETHiCS 837, 837-38 (2008).
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nondiscrimination provision of the law.32 Specifically, HIPAA prohibits
group health plans and group health insurance issuers from
discriminating on the basis of health factors such as disability, health
status, genetic information, medical history and claim experience in
enrollment eligibility, and premium contributions.
Essentially, a
covered entity cannot require person A to pay a higher premium then
similarly situated person B simply because person A has a disability or
medical condition.
However, the law also states that the nondiscrimination provisions
are not to be read to "prevent a group health plan from establishing
premium discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise applicable
copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health
promotion and disease prevention." 34
The Department of Labor, which enforces the nondiscrimination
provisions of HIPAA, has read this exception to permit the operation of
programs that shift benefits, premiums, or contributions based on
participation in a wellness program as long as they meet certain
standards.3 ' Those standards vary based on whether a reward is or is not
dependent on the achievement of a health outcome.36
Programs that offer a reward simply for participation in a program
are called "participatory wellness programs."3 These types of plans are
acceptable as long as they are made available to all similarly situated
individuals.
For instance, a plan that gives gift certificates to
employees who participate in a diagnostic testing program but does not
condition any further rewards or incentives on the results of the test
qualifies as a participatory program. Assuming the testing is open to all
similarly situated employees, it is acceptable under HIPAA.3 9
Programs that condition a reward on the achievement of "a standard
32. See 26 U.S.C. § 9802 (2006); see also Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness
Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 33158, 33158 (June 3, 2013).
33. See § 9802(a)-(b); see also Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in
Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33158. The factors listed in the statute include: (A) health
status; (B)medical condition (including both physical and mental illnesses); (C) claims experience;
(D) receipt of health care; (E)medical history; (F) genetic information; (G)evidence of insurability
(including conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence); and (H) disability.
Id. at § 9802(a)(1).
34. Id. at § 9802 (b)(2)(B).
35. See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 33159.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 33160.
38. Seeid.at33161.
39. See id.
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[that is] related to a health factor" are labeled "health contingent
wellness programs." 4 0 In order to satisfy HIPAA's nondiscrimination
requirements, the plans must meet five factors. The plan must give
"individuals eligible for the program ... the opportunity to qualify for
the reward at least once per year." 4' The size of the reward offered must
not "exceed the applicable percentage ... of the total cost of employeeonly coverage under the plan .... "42 The reward must be available to
all similarly situated individuals.43 The program must be "reasonably
designed to promote health or prevent disease."" And plan materials
must inform participants that alternate means of achieving the reward are
available.4 5
The ACA directly impacted one of these factors-the cap on the
46
overall size of the award that plans were permitted to offer. Prior to
the ACA, the Department of Labor regulations defined the applicable
percentage as a maximum of twenty percent of the total cost of coverage
under the plan.47 The ACA codified the cap at thirty percent and gave
the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury the
discretion to increase it to fifty percent of the total cost of coverage if
they felt an increase was appropriate.48 In final regulations issued in
June of 2013, the Secretaries opted to use this authority and increased
the maximum reward to fifty percent for smoking cessation programs
and thirty percent for all other wellness programs.4 9
The rest of the factors remain essentially unchanged. Acceptable

40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 33162.

42. Id.
43. See id. at 33163.
44. Id. at 33162.
45. See id. at 33163.
46. The ACA essentially codified the approach taken by the Department of Labor in its
HIPAA regulations. It amended the Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. §201 et seq.) provisions
on nondiscrimination at 42 U.S.C. §300gg-4 by adding paragraph (j). The language in this new
paragraph affirms the Department of Labor's division of wellness plans into "participatory" and
"health contingent programs" and largely reiterates the reasonable design, universal applicability
and reasonable alternative, frequency of opportunity, and notice requirements set forth by the
Department of Labor. That said, there are some ways in which the ACA approach deviates from
what the Department of Labor had done previously. For purposes of this article though, those
deviations are not significant. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(j) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74
(excluding P.L. 113-66 & 113-73)).
47. See Nondiscrimination & Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market,
71 Fed. Reg. 75014, 75018 (Dec. 13, 2006).
48. See 42 U.S.C.A. §300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012).
49. See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 33159.
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wellness plans must be open to all similarly situated individualsmeaning that if it is either "unreasonably difficult" or "medically
inadvisable" for a person to meet a standard, the plan must either waive
the standard or work with the person to craft a reasonable alternative
standard.50 The plans must also be based on some objective information
showing that they have "a reasonable chance of improving the health of,
or preventing disease in, participating individuals"-i.e. the programs
cannot act as a "subterfuge for discrimination" on the basis of a health
factor. 5' And plans must give adequate notice to participants that
alternatives are available.52
B. ADA and GINA
The ADA and GINA impact wellness programs in two ways. First,
both the ADA and GINA prohibit employers from subjecting employees
to medical exams and inquiries related to disability or medical history,
subject to certain exemptions.
Second, the ADA requires that
employers not discriminate against persons with disabilities on the basis
of disability in regard to compensation and other terms and conditions of
employment. 54 This prohibition includes not making reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
employee.ss
1. Medical Exams and Inquiries.
The ADA states that:
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and
shall not make medical inquiries of an employee as to whether
such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the
50. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i)(l)-(II). For example, say a plan offers rewards to
participants who have a cholesterol count below 200. If it is medically impossible for a participant
to achieve that goal due to a medical condition, the plan must make an alternative goal, such as a
diet or exercise program available upon request, or the plan must develop a goal that is medically
feasible for the participant. See generally Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in
Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33159.
5 1. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 33162; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B).
52. See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 33159; see also 42 U.S.CA. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-l(b) (Supp. IV 2006).
54. See42 U.S.C.§ 12112(a).
55. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or
inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity.56
The EEOC defines the term "disability-related inquiry" broadly to
include any "question (or series of questions) that is likely to elicit
information about a disability."5 7 And the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") reads "job-related and consistent
with business necessity" as requiring that an employer have "a
reasonable belief based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee's
ability to perform essential job functions [is or] will be impaired by a
medical condition; or (2) an employee will pose a direct threat due to a
medical condition."
59
Further, according to EEOC guidance and the majority of circuit
courts that have considered the question,o this provision is not limited to
employees with disabilities. Rather, the language is read as applying to
all employees. 6
GINA states that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to request, require, or purchase genetic information with
respect to an employee or a family member of the employee.. ."62 The
statute defines the term "genetic information" broadly to include an
individual's genetic tests, the genetic tests of family members, and the
manifestation of a disease or disorder in the family members of an
individual.63
Together these two statutes create a general rule that covered
entities cannot seek medical information from their employees unless it
M
meets one of the limited exceptions provided.6
56. Id. at § 12112(d)(4)(A).
57. Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC (July 27, 2000) (hereinafter
Enforcement Guidance], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep't of Health Services, 172 F.3d 1176, 1182
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a person without a disability can bring a claim under 102(d)(4) of the
ADA); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 595 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1455
(1999); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Resort, 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997). But see Krocka
v. Bransfield, 969 F. Supp. 1073, 1094 (N.D. Ill.) (holding that a plaintiff must be a person with a
disability in order to bring a cause of action under 102(d)(4)).
61. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 57; Fredenburg, 172 F.3d at 1182; Griffin, 160
F.3d at 595; Roe, 124 F.3d at 1229; but see Krocka, 969 F. Supp. at 1094.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-l(b) (Supp. IV 2006).
63. See 42 U.S.C. §2000ff(4) (Supp. IV 2006).
64. See supra notes 56, 62 and accompanying text. The ADA has a different set of rules for
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The ADA contains three exceptions. First, it permits examinations
and inquiries that are "job-related and consistent with business
necessity." 6 5 Second, it permits inquiries "into the ability of an employee
to perform job-related functions."66 Third, and most important for our
purposes, the ADA permits covered entities to "conduct voluntary
medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are
part of an employee health program available to employees at that work
site. ,,67
GINA provides one exception. Covered entities can collect genetic
information where: (1) "health or genetic services are offered by the
employer, including services offered as part of a wellness program;" (2)
"the employee provides prior, knowing, voluntary, and written
authorization;" (3) "only the employee ... and the licensed health care
professional or board certified genetic counselor involved in providing
such services receive individually identifiable information concerning
the results of such services;" and (4) "individual identifiable genetic
information provided ... is only available for purposes of such services
and shall not be disclosed to the employer except in aggregate terms that
do not disclose the identity of specific employees."68
So both statutes permit the collection of medical information for
"employee health programs" and services offered "as part of a wellness
program" as long as certain conditions are met. For the ADA, the
primary condition is that the information is provided voluntarily. 69
Under GINA, a person must supply the information voluntarily, with
written consent and the employer must make certain that only the person
providing the information and the medical professional operating the
program have access to individually identifiable information. 0
EEOC guidance currently defines a voluntary submission of
information similarly for both statutes. EEOC's enforcement guidance
on medical exams and inquiries under the ADA states that a wellness
plan is voluntary "as long as the employer neither requires participation
nor penalizes employees who do not participate."n Similarly, the
regulations implementing GINA say that an employer may offer
applicants and persons who receive provisional job offers. These are outside of the scope of this
article so they are not considered. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)-(3) (2006).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
66. Id. at § 12112(d)(4)(B).

67.

Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.

42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-l(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2006).
See § 12112(d)(4)(B).
§2000ff-l(b)(2).
Enforcement Guidanc, supra note 57.
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financial inducements for the completion of HRAs under GINA
provided that "the covered entity makes clear ... that the inducement
will be made available whether or not the participant answers questions
regarding genetic information" 72-essentially a statement that a covered
entity cannot require an employee to provide genetic information or
penalize them for refusing to provide that information.
2. Reasonable Accommodation
The ADA requires that covered entities provide persons with
disabilities equal access to benefits and other terms and conditions of
employment.73 This obligation includes providing reasonable
accommodation to ensure equal access to benefits unless such
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the finances or
operation of the covered entity.74
Wellness programs are a part of the benefits and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment offered by a covered entity.
As such, covered entities are under an obligation to provide reasonable
accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who require
such accommodations to enjoy equal access to these programs.
The impact of this requirement on wellness programs is plain. If,
due to a disability, a qualified individual with a disability is unable to
participate in a wellness program - say because this person's impairment
prevents them from engaging in the activity required (e.g. walking) or
because the impairment makes it impossible for the person to achieve a
wellness program goal (e.g. cholesterol level below 200)-the covered
entity must consider accommodations that would enable the individual
to participate. In the walking example, for instance, the covered entity
would need to consider an alternate activity that would enable the person
to participate-potentially a shorter program if walking is difficult due
to disability or some equivalent activity if the person is unable to walk
due to a disability. In the cholesterol example, the entity would need to
develop an alternate standard that the person is able to meet.
This requirement, of course, is remarkably similar to the
"reasonable alternative" standard put forward in the ACA and HIPPA
regulations. It is not entirely clear how much overlap there is between
the two concepts, however, since "reasonable alternative" is a relatively
72.
73.
74.
75.

29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(ii) (2013).
See 29 C.F.R. §1630.4(a)(1)(vi) (2013).
29 C.F.R. 1630.9(a) (2013).
See id
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new standard and there have been few, if any, ADA accommodation
claims related to wellness programs.
C. Seff and the ADA Insurance Safe Harbor
The final wrinkle to consider is the insurance safe harbor language
in the ADA and its applicability to wellness programs. Title IV of the
ADA contains the following language:
[s]ubchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act
shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health
maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that
administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of
a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of
a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that
regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.
The language was designed to protect the basic business operations
of insurance companies-namely, underwriting and classifying risks.77
Or, as the House Committee on Education and Labor Report put it:
"[t]he Committee does not intend that any provisions of this legislation
should affect the way the insurance industry does business in accordance

76.

42 U.S.C.

77.

See id.

§§

12201(c)(1)-(3) (2006).
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with the State laws and regulations under which it is regulated." 78
Wellness programs are not traditionally associated with basic risk
underwriting.79 The underwriting process is what determines the
premiums that an insurance company will charge a company or
individual seeking coverage.80 It is driven primarily by data and
actuarial models. 8 1 Wellness programs typically enter the process after
the premiums are set. They are either offered by the insurance company
or a third-party provider and serve as a kind of "bonus option" that can
help a company reduce its overall medical costs. 82 The programs are
essentially one step removed from basic underwriting.
That said, the association is close enough that some companies
have sought to use the safe-harbor as a defense to claims that a wellness
program violates the ADA. 83 Seff v. Broward County84 is the only case
to date where this claim has been tested.
In Seff, an employee filed an ADA claim against Broward County,
Florida, alleging that its wellness policy, which penalized employees
twenty dollars per pay period if they refused to complete an HRA and
submit to biometric testing, constituted an unlawful medical inquiry
Broward responded by stating that its wellness
under the ADA.
program was protected by the ADA insurance safe harbor and was not
subject to challenge. 86
The district court agreed with Broward's position and found that its
wellness program was a term of a bona fide benefit plan "designed to
develop and administer present and future benefit plan using accepted
principles of risk assessment." 87 In ruling that the program was covered
by the safe harbor, the district court relied heavily on two district court

78. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 409, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 409.
79. See generally infra note 82 and accompanying text.
80. See Zamora-Quezada v. Health-Texas Med. Grp., 34 F.Supp 433, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1998);
Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011), affd 691 F.3d 1221 (11 Cir.
2012).
81. See Larry Kirsch, Assessing the Actuarial Basis for Health-Related Underwriting in
2,
BAZELON
Insurance,
Disability
and
Medical
(last visited
http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=R9YQS4gzb44%3d&tabid=345
Mar. 9,2014).
82. See Sorren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study, DOL.GOV xiii,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/workplacewellnessstudyfinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
83. See e.g. Seffv. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1222 (1lth Cit. 2012).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1222.
86. Id.
87. Seffv. Broward Cnty., 778 F.Supp.-2d. 1370, 1374 (S.D.Fla. 2011), aff'd, 691 F.3d 1221
(1 Ith Cir. 2012).
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cases interpreting the safe harbor - Barnes v. Benham88 and ZamoraQuezada v. HealthTexas Medical Group.8 9
Barnes involved an employee who was terminated after he refused
to complete a health questionnaire attached to an application for health
insurance benefits and refused to sign a waiver stating that he was
offered the opportunity to apply for health benefits. 90 The employee
claimed that the questionnaire constituted an unlawful medical inquiry.91
The court ruled that the questionnaire fell within the ADA insurance safe
harbor as the inquiries were posed "solely for the purpose of
underwriting, classifying, and administering risk."9 2
Zamora-Quezada touched on the meaning of the term
"underwriting." 9 3 The court, citing the EEOC's interim guidance on
health insurance and the ADA, defined underwriting as "the application
of the various risk or risk classes to a particular individual or group for
the purposes of determining whether to provide coverage" and risk
classification as "the identification of risk factors and the groupings of
those factors which pose similar risks."94
Seff viewed these cases as supporting a reading of "underwriting
and classifying risks" that went beyond the usual process of setting
premiums based on actuarial data. 95 The district court stated that
"[t]hough [the County] is not underwriting or classifying risks on an
individual basis, [the County] is underwriting and classifying risks on a
macroscopic level so it may form economically sound benefit plans for
the future." 9 6
The plaintiff appealed this decision to the 11th Circuit. The appeal,
however, did not challenge the district court's analysis regarding the
scope of the underwriting and administering risk exception. 97 Rather, it
sought to overturn the district court finding that the wellness program
was a "term" of the County's health plan.98 The 11th Circuit rejected
88. Barnes v. Benham Group, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 1013 (D.Minn.1998).
89. 778 F.Supp.2d at 1373-74 (citing Barnes v. Benham Group, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 1013
(D.Minn.1998); Zamora-Quezada v. Health-Texas Med. Grp., 34 F.Supp 433, 443 (W.D. Tex.
1998).
90. Barnes, 22 F.Supp.2d at 1017.
91. Id. at 1019.
92. Id. at 1020.
93. Zamora-Quezada v. Health-Texas Med. Grp., 34 F.Supp 433, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
94. Id.
95. Seffv. Broward Cnty., 778 F.Supp.2d. 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011), af'd, 691 F.3d 1221
(11th Cir. 2012).
96. Id.
97. See Seffv. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
98. Id
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the plaintiffs arguments on this point and found that the wellness
program was, in fact, a term of the County's health plan. 99 The 11th
Circuit did not, however, address the district court's reasoning on the
application of the safe harbor.'0 0
Seff is one case from one circuit so it is difficult to draw broad
conclusions about its impact. Obviously, if the district court analysis in
Seff is widely accepted then the ADA restrictions will not be a factor for
wellness programs. There are reasons to be skeptical about that outcome
though. First, as is noted above, the ADA plainly contemplates the use
of wellness programs.10 1 To the extent that a "safe harbor" is needed,
the statute provides one with its exception for voluntary medical
inquiries in response to employee health programs. 102 The Seff reading
of the insurance safe harbor would seem to read that provision out of the
statute. Second, the broad reading of underwriting advocated by Seff is
at odds with EEOC guidance on the insurance safe harbor.o The
interpretive appendix to the ADA regulations states that the insurance
safe harbor "is a limited exception that is only applicable to those who
establish, sponsor, observe or administer benefit plans,. . ."'0 The safe
harbor's purpose "is to permit the development and administration of
benefit plans in accordance with the accepted principles of risk
assessment." 10 5 The district court analysis in Seff goes well beyond
these principles.
That being said, wellness plan providers and employers will likely
continue to test the theory in Seff Only time will tell whether the courts
adopt or reject it. For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that
the ADA insurance safe-harbor is not applicable as its application
essentially moots the tension that this article attempts to frame. Readers
should bear in mind that the adoption of the safe-harbor is a potential
outcome though.
IV. FRAMING THE PROBLEM

We have four laws that, for the most part, speak to different

99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2006).
Id.
See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(f) (2013).
Id.
Id.
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elements of wellness programs. ACA and HIPAA discuss how wellness
programs with financial incentives conditioned on health factors can
operate without violating HIPAA's provisions on nondiscrimination.106
The ADA and GINA address how employee health and wellness
programs can gather medical information without violating each
statute's general prohibition regarding the collection of medical
information. 0 7
The question is whether these laws work as a coherent whole or
whether there is an inherent tension in the standards they employ. The
answer turns, in large part, on how one interprets the term "voluntary" in
the ADA and GINA.
In order to operate effectively, wellness programs need access to
medical information.10 8 This is true regardless of whether the program
seeks medical information to alert participants to health risks, guide
participants to preventive programs, or establish health goals. 109
The inquiries used to gather this information inevitably fall under
the ADA/GINA prohibition on involuntary medical exams and
0 If one
inquiries.o"
believes that the presence of a penalty or reward that
meets the ACA and HIPAA standards does not impact the voluntariness
of a program, then there is no tension. The laws work in perfect
harmony. If, however, one believes that financial inducements can
render submission of medical information to a wellness program
involuntary, then there is significant tension and a solution to that
tension must be found.

106. See 26 U.S.C. §9802(b)(2)(B) (2006).
107. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
108. See Berry, supra note 4, at 109.
109. See id. at 108-09.
110. Readers will also recall that the ADA provides an exemption for inquiries that are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. Informal discussion letters from the EEOC's Office
of Legal Counsel have consistently found that wellness programs are not job-related and consistent
with business necessity and there is not much argument about that point. Wellness programs are in
no way related to the performance of a job. See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, DISCUSSION
LETTER

ON

HEALTH

RISK

ASSESSMENT

AND

THE

ADA

(2009),

available

at

http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2009/ada-health_riskassessment.html (stating that the
completion of HRAs "[do] not appear to be job-related and consistent with business necessity ...
[blecause all employees are required to complete a health risk assessment ... [and] there is no
indication that your client has concerns that a particular employee will be unable to do his job or
will pose a direct threat because of a medical condition."); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
EEOC, ADA: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS; HEALTH RISK

ASSESSMENT
(2009)
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2009/ada-disability medexamhealthrisk.html (noting that
HRAs that do not appear to be job-related and consistent with business necessity would violate the
ADA).
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The argument in support of harmony maintains that each law is
ultimately concerned with the same thing-coercion. The ADA and
GINA prevent covered entities from forcing employees to provide
medical information."' Similarly, the incentive standards in the ACA
and HIPAA are, as the 2006 HIPAA regulation stated, designed so that
permitted incentives are not "so large as to have the effect of denying
coverage or creating too heavy a financial penalty on individuals who do
not satisfy an initial wellness program standard."ll 2 Congress and the
Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Treasury have
determined that inducements up to thirty percent of the employee cost of
coverage (and fifty percent for programs aimed at smoking cessation) do
not cross this threshold." 3 According to this theory, if these programs
are not coercive under ACA and HIPAA then they must also be not
coercive, or voluntary, under the ADA and GINA.114 Therefore, there is
no tension. A wellness plan that works for ACA/HIPAA should work for
the ADA/GINA.
The argument against harmony employs different logic. It states
that voluntary under the ADA/GINA means essentially what the EEOC
said it meant in its enforcement guidance-a program cannot require
participation or penalize employees who fail to participate. "s And, if
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8 (2013); See supranote I10 and accompanying text.
112. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs n Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71
Fed. Reg. 74755, 75018 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590).
113. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. 32979, 33158 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590).
114. And, as supporters of this theory would note, the EEOC at one point did say that a
wellness plan would be voluntary if it complied with the ACA and HIPPA standards. A January 6,
2009 informal discussion letter from then Legal Counsel Reed Russell stated that:
[A] wellness program would be considered voluntary and any disability-related inquiries
or medical examinations conducted in connection with it would not violate the ADA, as
long as the inducement to participate in the program did not exceed twenty percent of the
cost of employee only or employee and dependent coverage under the plan, consistent
with regulations promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, ADA: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL
at
available
(2009)
ASSESSMENT
RISK
HEALTH
EXAMINATIONS;
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2009/adadisability-medexam_healthrisk.html.
That portion of the letter was subsequently overturned in March 9, 2009 letter from Legal Counsel
Peggy Mastroianni. The justification was that the letter prompting Legal Counsel Reed's reply had
not asked for an opinion about acceptable inducement levels under the ADA. See OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, EEOC, ADA: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS; HEALTH
at
available
(2009)
ASSESSMENT
RISK
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2009/ada disability medexam-healthrisk.html.
115. Enforcement Guidance: Disability Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC 15 (July 27, 2000),
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one applies that definition strictly, no program that offers incentives for
health information-regardless of whether those incentives are for
information used in a "participatory program" or "health contingent
program" as defined in the ACA and HIPAA-is voluntary. The use of
incentives will inevitably penalize employees who decline to participate
(as the incentive is withheld from them) or, if the inducements approach
the maximum levels sanctioned by the ACA and HIPAA, amount to a
requirement to participate through the imposition of unsustainable costs
on those who opt-out.116 As a result, there is a great deal of tension
between these laws.
The solution to this tension depends heavily upon how one frames
the conflict between the laws. The first option is to frame it as the
functional equivalent of a direct statutory conflict. We are presented
with two sets of statute that deal with similar issues. The terms in one
group appear to implicitly prohibit or, at the least, severely constrain
programs permitted by the other group. It seems fair to say that
whatever Congress said was permitted in the last statute (here the ACA)
should govern what is permitted under the other statutes.
The second option is to accept the tension as a result intended by
Congress. It is true that the laws deal with similar broad themes. But, at
a granular level, they confront different problems. HIPAA and the ACA
deal with the ways in which group plans and providers can vary rates
and premiums on the basis of health factors such as disability and
genetic information.1 17 GINA and the ADA are concerned with the
circumstances under which a person can be compelled to provide that
information."8 It is conceivable that Congress would impose different
standards for each of these areas. Further, Congress had the chance to
explicitly declare that the methods permitted under HIPAA should be
permitted under the ADA and GINA as well but it failed to do so." 9
The amendments in the ACA are only applicable to the section
amended-they do not apply "notwithstanding any provision of law." 20
The only solution is to craft a nuanced policy that reflects the inherent
tension.
It is beyond the scope of this article to say whether the arguments
for or against tension are correct or, if one accepts that there is tension,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
116. See id.
117. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
118. See supra Part II.B.
119. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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whether we are presented with the equivalent of a direct conflict or not.
The courts, the relevant administrative agencies, and possibly Congress
will need to arrive at the conclusion.
The manner in which the relevant actors choose to view the
problem will have a sizeable impact on the solution that is developed
though. For, if there is no tension, then there is no problem that needs to
be resolved. A statement from an administrative agency or court that no
tension exists is all that is required to put uncertainty to rest. But, if
there is tension, then a court, administrative agency, or potentially
Congress has to take steps to resolve that tension. If one believes that
the tension is the result of a direct conflict in law, then the answer is
simple-the last set of standards passed is acceptable under the older
statutes. If one believes that the tension is intended, however, and that
Congress appears to have wanted both sets of rules to apply - in spite of
the policy conflict that creates - then a more nuanced answer is required.
Only time will tell which policy outcome will prevail.
V. CONCLUSION

The jumble of standards that apply to wellness programs presents
an interesting dilemma. Through its own actions, and in some cases
inaction, Congress has developed a system of rules that could conflict on
a practical level. It is now up to the courts, the administrative agencies,
and potentially Congress, to decide whether a conflict exists and, if so,
determine the appropriate resolution to that conflict.
This article has sought to explore the various ways one can frame
this conflict. It does this on the theory that the manner in which one
frames the problem will have a heavy influence on the ultimate solution
that is developed. Though a firm conclusion regarding which frame
should be used in crafting the solution is beyond the scope of this article,
it is hoped that clarifying the frames will allow others to make coherent
arguments about what the appropriate solution will look like.
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